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Introduction
It is a slight exaggeration to say that Barack Obama is the first president in American
history to have run in part on a political platform of targeted killings—but not much of
one. During the campaign, he openly sought to one-up the Republican nominee, Sen.
John McCain, in his enthusiasm for the use of targeted strikes in Pakistan against al
Qaeda figures. “You know,” he said in his speech at the Democratic National
Convention, “John McCain likes to say that he’ll follow [Osama] Bin Laden to the Gates
of Hell, but he won’t even go to the cave where he lives.” 1 That he would, as president,
follow bin Laden to his cave, with or without the cooperation of the Pakistani
government, he made perfectly clear. “If we have actionable intelligence about highvalue terrorist targets and President [Pervez] Musharraf won’t act, we will,” he said in
another speech. 2 Indeed, while he criticized President Bush for being too aggressive in
many aspects of counterterrorism, with respect to targeted killings, his criticism was the
polar opposite: “The Bush administration has not acted aggressively enough to go after al
Qaeda’s leadership,” he said. “I would be clear that if Pakistan cannot or will not take out
al Qaeda leadership when we have actionable intelligence about their whereabouts, we
will act to protect the American people. There can be no safe haven for al Qaeda
terrorists who killed thousands of Americans and threaten our homeland today.” 3
Obama did not take long, on assuming office, to begin keeping his promise. On January
23, 2009 a mere three days into his presidency, strikes by Predator drones in the tribal
areas of Pakistan destroyed two compounds and killed numerous people, reportedly
including a high-value target. 4 Strikes continued, even expanded, over the successive
months, and administration officials made clear that they had no plans to curtail them—
even as they reined in coercive interrogations and announced the closure of Guantánamo
Bay. 5
Obama was right as a candidate and is correct as president to insist on the propriety of
targeted killings—that is, the targeting of a specific individual to be killed, increasingly
often by means of high technology, remote-controlled Predator drone aircraft wielding
missiles from a stand-off position. The strategic logic that presses toward targeted standoff killing as a necessary, available and technologically advancing part of
counterterrorism is overpowering. So too is the moral and humanitarian logic behind its
use. Just as crucial programs of Predator-centered targeted killing are underway now in
Afghanistan and, with increasing international controversy, Pakistan, over the long term
these programs of stand-off targeted killing will be an essential element in United States
counterterrorism into the future—and with targets having little or nothing to do with
today’s iteration of the war on terror. 6 Future administrations, even if they naturally
prefer to couch the matter in softer terms, will likely follow the same path. Even if the
whole notion seems to some disturbingly close to arbitrary killing, not open combat, it is
often the most expedient—and, despite civilian casualties that do occur, most
discriminatingly humanitarian—manner to neutralize a terrorist without unduly
jeopardizing either civilians or American forces.
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But there’s a paradox in Obama’s embrace of targeted killing: Even as the strategic and
humanitarian logic for it increases in persuasiveness, the legal space for it and the legal
rationales on which it has been traditionally justified are in danger of shrinking. They are
at risk of shrinking in ways that might surprise members of Congress and the Obama
Administration. And they are at risk of shrinking through seemingly innocuous, unrelated
legal policy actions that the Obama Administration and Congress might be inclined to
take in support of various political constituencies, usually related to broadly admirable
goals of human rights and international law.
American domestic law—the law codifying the existence of the CIA and defining its
functions—has long accepted implicitly at least some uses of force, including targeted
killing, as self-defense toward ends of vital national security that do not necessarily fall
within the strict terms of armed conflict in the sense meant by the Geneva Conventions
and other international treaties on the conduct of armed conflict. Categories of the use of
force short of armed conflict or war in a juridical sense—by intelligence services such as
the CIA, for example—or by military agents in furtherance of national self defense and
vital security interests, yet outside of the legal condition of armed conflict, date back in
codified law to the founding of the CIA and, in state practice by the United States and
other sovereigns, far further still. Yet as a matter of legal justification, successive
administrations have already begun to cede this ground. Even the Bush Administration,
with its unrivaled enthusiasm for executive power, always sought to cast its killing targets
as the killing of combatants in what it legally characterized as armed conflicts, governed
by the laws of war on the conduct of hostilities, known as “international humanitarian
law” (IHL). This concession, however, if followed by the Obama Administration and
beyond, will likely reduce the practical utility of a policy and security tool of both longstanding provenance and proven current value. It will likely reduce the flexibility of the
United States to respond to emerging threats before they ripen into yet another war with
non-state terrorists, and it will reduce the ability of the United Sates to address terrorist
threats in the most discriminating fashion advancing technology permits.
At this moment in which many policymakers, members of Congress and serious
observers see primarily a need to roll back policies and assertions of authority made by
the Bush Administration, any call for the Obama Administration and Congress to insist
upon powers of unilateral targeted killing and to claim a zone of authority outside of
armed conflict governed by IHL that even the Bush Administration did not claim must
seem at once atavistic, eccentric, myopic and perverse. Many will not much care that
such legal authority already exists in international and U.S. domestic law. Yet the
purpose of this chapter is to suggest that, on the contrary, the uses to which the Obama
Administration seeks to put targeted killing are proper, but they will require that it
carefully preserve and defend legal authorities it should not be taking for granted and that
its predecessors, including the Bush Administration, have not adequately preserved for
their present day uses.
People who threaten serious harm to the United States will not always be al Qaeda, after
all. Nor will they forever be those persons who, in the words of the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force (AUMF), “planned, authorized, committed or aided” the attacks of
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September 11. 7 As I will explain, it would have been better had the Bush and Clinton
Administrations, for their parts, formulated their legal justifications for the targeted uses
of force around the legal powers traditionally asserted by the United States: the right of
self-defense, including the right to use force even in circumstances not rising to the level
of an “armed conflict” in order to have firmly fixed in place the clear legal ability of the
United States to respond as it traditionally has. Although the United States still has a long
way to go to dismember al Qaeda, its affiliates and subsidiaries, although Osama bin
Laden and key al Qaeda terrorist leaders remain at large, and although the President of
the United States still exercises sweeping powers both inherent and granted by Congress
to use all national power against the perpetrators of September 11, time moves on. New
threats will emerge, some of them from states and others from non-state actors, including
terrorist organizations. Some of those new threats will be new forms of jihadist terrorism;
others will champion new and different causes. Even now, Islamist terror appears to be
fragmenting into loose networks of shared ideology and aspiration rather than tightly
vertical organizations linked by command and control. 8 It will take successive feats of
intellectual jujitsu to cast all of the targets such developments will reasonably put in the
cross hairs as, legally speaking, combatants.
Yet the problem is still deeper and more immediate than that, for the accepted space for
targeted killings is eroding even within what a reasonable American might understand as
the four corners of our conflict with al Qaeda. In many situations in which any American
president, Obama certainly included, would want to use a targeted killing, it is unclear to
some important actors—at the United Nations, among our allies, among international law
scholars, and among NGO activists—as a matter of international law that a state of armed
conflict actually exists or that a targeted killing can qualify as an act of self-defense. The
legal situation, therefore, threatens to become one in which, on the one hand, targeted
killing outside of a juridical armed conflict is legally impermissible and, on the other
hand, as a practical matter, no targeted killing even within the context of a “war” with al
Qaeda is legally permissible, either.
Congress’s role in this area is admittedly a peculiar one. It is mostly—though not
entirely—politically defensive in nature. After all, the domestic legal authorities to
conduct targeted killings and other “intelligence” uses of force have existed in statutory
form at least since the legislation that established the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947
and in other forms long pre-dating that. 9 The problem is that although domestic legal
authority exists for the use of force against terrorists abroad, currents are stirring in
international law and elsewhere that move to undermine that authority. Powerful trend
and opinion-setting—so-called “soft law”—currents are developing in ways that, over
time, promise to make the exercise of this activity ever more difficult and to create a
presumption, difficult to overcome, that targeted killing is in fact both illegitimate and,
indeed, per se illegal except in the narrowest of war-like conditions. The role of Congress
is therefore to reassert, reaffirm, and reinvigorate the category as a matter of domestic
law and policy, and as the considered, official view of the United States as a matter of
international law.
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The Strategic and Moral Logic of Targeted Killings
American counterterrorism is a hybrid employing distinct palettes of legal tools. One is
criminal law enforcement; another is armed conflict. 10 Americans have been arguing
about these two palettes—their relative uses, merits, and limitations—nonstop since
September 11. Each occupies important ground in the legal and policy regulation of uses
of force and violence in counterterrorism. As a matter of long-term counterterrorism
strategy, each will continue to play an important role. Moreover, despite many nowfamiliar arguments, sometimes ferocious, over such issues as Guantánamo, habeas
corpus, civilian versus military criminal trials, detention, rendition, and interrogation,
each of these fields—law enforcement and armed conflict—have well established legal
and policy protocols.
Criminal law is not about killing people as such; it is, rather, about arresting, literally
stopping their activities and punishing them for ones that violate the law. Resisting arrest
can lead to deadly violence, but the paradigm of law enforcement is one that
fundamentally takes place within an ordered domestic society in which the governmental
use of deadly force is incidental to the attempt to arrest alleged criminals. That is, its
virtue is that it takes place in a settled, ordered society with a legitimate government.
That also represents its limitation in dealing with terrorists, who are at once enemies of
that society and criminals in their methods and often shelter beyond the reach of its
institutions. 11
Armed conflict accepts a willingness to kill people in the pursuit of political ends, and
those killings are not limited merely to killings incident to attempted arrest. Its virtue is
that it is addressed to enemies who come from outside a settled society, but its limitation
is that its uses of force are not underwritten with the legitimacy of a state in an ordered
society. Policing and war-making are two radically different deployments of violence by
the state, the former the exercise of a legitimate near-monopoly on violence and the latter
the exercise of the level of violence dictated by military necessity so as to create a
monopoly on violence. 12 Yet core standards are reasonably clear for both criminal law
and war law. To the extent that we debate these core standards, we normally do so on
account of their uncertain application to an activity—terrorism by transnational non-state
actors—that lies at the margins, rather than the core, of each.
Even pre-dating the September 11 era, 13 however, counterterrorism as practice, law, and
policy has also consisted of activities that do not fall neatly under either of these two
existing legal regimes. 14 Their broadest policy description is “intelligence,” but that term
encompasses an extraordinarily heterogeneous set of activities. These include classical
intelligence gathering functions, such as surveillance—including telecommunications and
Internet surveillance, human intelligence, satellite and observation intelligence, and
analysis of material collected by whatever other means. They also include intelligence
community, law enforcement, military, and diplomatic coordination and exchange of
information with friends and allies abroad. They include—of ever-increasing
importance—the interdiction of terrorist finances and the investigation, seizure, and
freezing of economic assets essential to terrorist organizations. In this discussion, I
5

loosely refer to all these activities as a “third” aspect of counterterrorism, a “third way of
counterterrorism,” or as “intelligence” activities in counterterrorism, despite their
heterogeneity. 15 And this third aspect of counterterrorism also includes the traditional
intelligence function of the covert uses of force. 16
Within the wide range of intelligence functions, one naturally stands out as especially
controversial: the use of, or the threat to use, deadly force. For while intelligence
activities raise many thorny issues of domestic and international law, particularly when
conducted on foreign territory and in violation of local law and sovereignty, none is so
difficult as those which involve killing people.
Call it a “war on terror,” however, call it something else, it does not really matter. 17 A
full response to terrorism, to al Qaeda and beyond, requires actions across all three of
these areas: criminal law, armed conflict, and “intelligence” functions, including covert
deadly force and targeted killing. The Obama Administration and the administrations that
follow it will rely increasingly on intelligence-based uses of force in counterterrorism
undertaken outside the United States. However the activity is characterized as a legal
matter or as a public relations label or policy euphemism, U.S. administrations will rely
upon targeted killing as a means of dealing with suspected terrorists—with al Qaeda, its
successors, imitators and emulators, and with those who come after it, whether they share
similar or dissimilar ideological causes, and whether or not Congress has passed a
successor to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. 18 The Predator and Hellfire
missile were identified early on by candidate Obama as the weapons of the future, as the
U.S. gradually seeks to ratchet down its full-on, overt wars.19 And the Obama
Administration is not wrong to see the strategic advantages of the Predator, now and into
the future.
This view is deeply embedded within the mainstream of President Obama’s party. To cite
only one example, note how unambiguously Democratic international relations and
intelligence eminence grises Graham Allison and John Deutch endorsed the Predator
policy with regards to Pakistan:
The counterterrorism strategy [of Predator strikes] in Pakistan that has emerged
since last summer offers our best hope for regional stability and success in dealing
a decisive blow against al Qaeda and what Vice President Joe Biden calls
“incorrigible” Taliban adherents. But implementing these operations requires light
U.S. footprints backed by drones and other technology that allows missile attacks
on identified targets [emphasis added]. 20
In response to the increasingly heard claim that the drone-and-missile targeted killing
strategy backfires by inflaming Pakistani public opinion against the United States
because of collateral civilian deaths—most recently, for example, from Australian
counters=insurgency expert David Kilcullen, who urged Congress in testimony to “call
off the drones” 21 —Allison and Deutch offer a remarkably realpolitik answer. If “many
Pakistanis see covert actions carried out inside their country as America ‘invading an
ally,’” the problem is not the drone campaign, they write; it is, rather, merely that “the
U.S. government no longer seems capable of conducting covert operations without
having them reported in the press [emphasis added].” 22
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There is a fundamental strategic and moral rationale lying behind both the policy trend
toward targeted killing and toward the use of robotic and stand-off platforms such as the
Predator drone as the preferred means of effectuating it. The United States has found the
limits of how extensively it can wage full-scale wars with its military; even if it wanted to
take on more wars, it has logistical and political limits. In addition, the United States has
discovered that full-on war is useful principally against regimes. Full-scale, large-scale
warfare of the kind waged in Afghanistan and Iraq is useful primarily for bringing down
a government that, for example, might harbor or support terrorists, or which might be
believed to be willing to supply terrorists with materials for weapons of mass destruction.
While this tool has a crucial strategic place in national counterterrorism policy, by its
nature, its role is about states and state-like groups. Large-scale military operations are
less useful directly against transnational terrorists, who are few in number, dispersed
across populations and often borders, disinclined to fight direct battles, and more
efficiently targeted through narrower means. The fundamental role of overt warfare in
counterterrorism is to eliminate the regimes that provide safe haven to terrorist groups;
terrorist groups themselves can be strategically understood as an extreme version of a
guerrilla organization engaged in a strategy of logistical raiding—in which civilian
morale and the resulting manipulation of political will is the logistical target. 23 Logistical
raiders typically need a safe base to which to retreat, and full-scale war is most useful in
eliminating such safe bases and convincing other regimes not to provide them. 24 But it is
not usually an efficient way of going directly after the transnational terrorist groups
themselves. 25
Law enforcement utilized outside the United States, on the other hand, has also
discovered its outer limits. Many debates are still to be had over the rights of alleged
terrorists once in U.S. custody. But whatever they are, few would argue that going out to
“arrest” terrorists in, for example, Pakistan’s tribal zones is a winning policy or a serious
option. The same is true in Somalia and other places, and it will be true in other places in
the world in the future.
Moreover, the political costs for any U.S. administration in taking and holding detainees
are now enormous. 26 Once you hold them, over time, they will likely be accorded quasiConstitutional protections by the courts in some matters, and they will receive at least
some version of habeas corpus. Politically, the most powerful institutional incentive
today is to kill rather than capture them. The intelligence losses of killing people, rather
than capturing and interrogating them, are great. 27 But since the U.S. political and legal
situation has made aggressive interrogation a questionable activity anyway, there is less
reason to seek to capture rather than kill. And if one intends to kill, the incentive is to do
so from a standoff position, because it removes potentially messy questions of surrender.
All of this speaks to the advantages to the U.S. government of targeted killing of
terrorists or persons seriously believed to be terrorists; it also speaks to the advantages to
the government of using stand-off robotics technology to perform these attacks. But the
humanitarian advantages of targeted killing are enormously important as well and ought
to be on the table. This is particularly so given that targeted killing has come in for a
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barrage of criticism, legal and ethical, much of which seems perversely motivated by the
fact that it can be more discriminate than full-scale military assault. 28 The fear seems to
be that targeted killing using Predators and other robotics systems “lower[s] the threshold
for violence.” 29 It makes violence too easy to undertake. 30
The same criticism is offered of evolving robotic technology that increasingly allows
targeted uses of force without having to risk one’s own personnel. Not using one’s own
personnel allows a party to attack without the fear of counterassault that might increase
the need to use greater amounts of force and cause greater collateral damage—but it also,
so it is sometimes argued, thereby reduces the inhibitions on the decision to use force. 31
Military technology theorist P.W. Singer, for example, says of robotic unmanned
weapons systems: “When faced with a dispute or crisis, policymakers have typically
regarded the use of force as the ‘option of last resort.’ Unmanned systems might now
help that option move up the list, with each upward step making war more likely.” 32
Whatever the critics say, however, is unlikely to sway U.S. strategic policy under the
Obama Administration or anyone else subsequently. 33 The humanitarian benefits of
precision targeting are far more obvious than the more remote and abstract suppositions
of their humanitarian costs. Their direct policy consequence is to introduce greater
discrimination in targeting than full-scale military assault and large-scale war permit.
Advancing technology allows for more discrete surveillance and, therefore, more precise
targeting that is better able to minimize collateral civilian damage. This is a good thing
for those who do not want to kill innocent civilians. Indeed, humanitarians long called
upon advanced militaries to shift from designing more destructive weapons systems to
designing more discriminating ones; weapons designers have been seeking to comply
over decades, and there is something perverse about now criticizing their evolving efforts
as making war so much less destructive and so discriminating as to be too easy to
undertake.
The result is a strategic and moral incentive for targeted killing and for increasing the
quality of technology to make targeted killings both more precision-targeted and more
standoff. Precision targeting and standoff delivery are each independently desirable and,
in combination, considerably increase this incentive.
None of this alters the equally impeccable strategic logic underlying the use of law
enforcement mechanisms in some circumstances. Nor does it alter the logic behind other
forms of intelligence activities, such as surveillance or financial interdiction, or even the
use of open, full-on war. 34 We can by no means rule out the toppling of a regime in
pursuit of counterterrorism during the next ten or twelve years. But these are not
disjunctive policies. Targeted killing is likely to increase as a policy preference as fullscale wars decrease in number and intensity and become less desirable as a means of
effectuating counterterrorist objectives. Bush’s Iraq adventure has surely reduced the
American appetite for invading the tribal regions of Pakistan, for example, and something
has to fill the gap. That need is partly what has augmented the Predator’s appeal,
especially to the Obama Administration. No doubt there will be political pushback—
claims that the effect of the Predator campaigns in Pakistan are backfiring by mobilizing
8

Pakistani anger at civilian casualties, for example. But given the political unreliability
and military ineffectiveness of the Pakistani army and its preference for artillery barrages
over focused counterinsurgency, these arguments are not likely to persuade.
The United States has long accepted a legal, political, and policy space for the use of
force that does not take place in the course of judicially supervised law enforcement
operations but also takes place outside of the context of large-scale, open armed conflict
meeting the treaty definitions, or rising to a sufficient level of violence, so as to be
governed by IHL. This was a space of activity accepted and considered vital to selfdefense and national security throughout the long decades of the Cold War. Only in
certain narrow times and places, after all, was the conflict with the Soviet Union and its
allies a “hot” war, characterized by open and large-scale armed conflict, the sort of
clashing of armies formally governed by IHL. 35 Political violence during the Cold War
was often covert, often denied, but it was authorized and endorsed by American domestic
law, dating back at least to the statutes founding the CIA in 1947. That was so even
though the activity in question frequently violated the law and sovereignty of states in
which it took place and unsurprisingly was sometimes, too, a source of grave diplomatic
and other friction. Following the revelation of abuses by the CIA in the 1970s, U.S.
domestic law was tightened, “assassination” prohibited by President Ford’s 1976
Executive Order, and Congressional oversight mechanisms strengthened. But, as
discussed below, far from eliminating this category of violence by limiting such uses of
force solely to “armed conflict” in the meaning governed by IHL, U.S. domestic law
quietly and intentionally preserved the category while strengthening the oversight.
This category of force is now an obvious means by which to confront non-state
transnational terrorists outside the territorial United States. The United States is no longer
in the Cold War. But the legal and political regimes that it (and other states, both friend
and foe) elaborated through state practice, allowing uses of covert and discrete force as a
matter of self-defense, are, if anything, more relevant in confronting transnational
terrorism today. Yet as matters now stand, great pressures will come to bear against the
very existence of this legal and political category—great precisely because they are
idealistic and morally well-intended. Should these pressures prevail, they will bind the
hands of the President and Congress so as to prevent them from taking what is
paradoxically the most discrete and most precisely-targeted lethal measures available
against terrorists. The result would be to throw the United States into the much more
difficult policy dilemma of using larger-scale military activity against terrorists or taking
no very meaningful action at all. 36

Targeted Killing and Armed Conflict
Targeted killing is not a generally defined legal term in domestic or international law. 37
For our purposes, I take it here to mean the intentional, direct targeting of a person with
lethal force intended to cause his death. It is not an unintended collateral killing. Targeted
killings can sometimes occur in law enforcement, for example the killing of a hostagetaker in order to save the victim or, for that matter, capital punishment. Likewise, they
9

frequently and without particular controversy take place as part of overt, open armed
conflict—circumstances in which IHL is unquestionably the paradigm of law-in-force.
While there are some important questions about the application of the rules of targeted
killings in situations of unquestioned, open, large-scale armed conflict, the pattern of
rules under IHL is relatively clear. 38
The trouble for the United States arises because, as the war on terror migrates away from
the most overt of armed conflict situations, the question of whether a given targeted
killing takes place in a legally cognizable armed conflict becomes open to debate. This
might seem surprising, given the importance of targeted killing as part of armed conflict
in U.S. military doctrine and its importance in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, as
well as the extension of the Afghanistan operation into Pakistan. Predator strikes have
been important in all of those operations, and anyway they are not the only kinds of
“covert,” unacknowledged operations involving both military and CIA personnel taking
place in Pakistan and elsewhere. 39 But at least if armed conflict means as a matter of law
anything more than the mere fact that a party has undertaken to use lethal force, it is not
always clear that these killings are actually targeted killings within, rather than outside of,
armed conflict.
This anomaly reflects different legal meanings and standards, pursuant to different legal
instruments and regimes, for the term “armed conflict.” The problem is not merely that
terms have one meaning in the ordinary parlance and another in legally precise contexts.
One scholar points out that the recent massive, three volume, four thousand-plus page
International Committee of the Red Cross study on the customary law of international
humanitarian law “included nothing on the definition of the term, because it remains
much disputed…[and] terminological disputes are rife; several commentators express
doubt, for instance, that attacks even by well organized terrorist groups like al Qaeda can
constitute ‘armed attacks’ within the meaning” of the UN Charter and, by implication, the
international law of self-defense. 40
International lawyers argue over the meaning of “armed conflict,” starting with the most
basic question: Is it a term referring specially to the law of “resort to force,” or to the
conduct of warfare, IHL, or both? Eminent legal scholar and former West Point law
professor Gary Solis states flatly, for example, that for a targeted killing to be lawful, “an
international or noninternational conflict must be in progress. Without an ongoing armed
conflict the targeted killing of a civilian, terrorist or not, would be assassination—a
homicide and a domestic crime.” 41 But that only raises the question of what constitutes
an “armed conflict” in the first place.
Does the prohibition to which Solis alludes refer to armed conflict in the sense of a resort
to force in self-defense? Or instead to armed conflict within the meaning of IHL,
governing not the decision to resort to force, but how the use of force is conducted in
hostilities? If the former, then the long-existing structure of civilian CIA authority to act
in accordance with domestic law makes sense. If the latter (or both), then the lawful
function of the CIA to use force becomes unclear at best, because it is a civilian agency

10

with authority to act, as discussed below, outside of contexts involving IHL armed
conflict.
The stakes on this question are high, because the international legal standards that must
be satisfied are radically, conceptually different. They answer sharply different questions.
International law governing the resort to force is fundamentally about separating
legitimate self-defense from illegitimate aggression. IHL, by contrast, does not address
the legitimacy of the resort to force, but instead addresses the conduct of any party in an
armed conflict. It is concerned, at bottom, with the conduct of the parties in hostilities,
with separating combatants from noncombatants. It does not apply to every resort to
force—only those that meet particular treaty requirements or rise to a certain level of
violence constituting IHL “armed conflict.” Yet if it’s really simple murder legally, as
Solis suggests, to engage in a targeted killing outside of such armed conflict—even if in
lawful self-defense—then the United States has a big problem.
In the common, lay understanding of the term “armed conflict,” at least, it is obvious that
the United States is engaged in one in Pakistan; its aircraft and missiles are engaged
against targets there, and it sends in special forces and other personnel to engage in
fighting as well. Again, in the common understanding of the term, it was only a little less
obvious that a Predator strike against an al Qaeda figure fleeing in a vehicle across the
desert in Yemen was part of America’s “armed conflict,” its war, against al Qaeda. For
that matter, in that same common understanding—if not, perhaps surprisingly, in the
views of all legal commentators—September 11 itself constituted an armed attack, an
undertaking in an armed conflict initiated by al Qaeda. Even if al Qaeda is a non-state
actor using criminal ends, September 11 was an act at once part of an armed conflict and
also a crime.
But as a question of IHL, whether something is an “armed conflict” to which the rules of
warfare apply is not settled simply by saying that a party—the United States—has
undertaken a targeted killing and therefore is engaged in armed conflict governed by IHL.
The U.S. government, after all, might simply have engaged in murder. The same is true
for an al Qaeda attack. The fact that both al Qaeda, a non-state actor, and the United
States regard themselves as in a state of war with one another is peculiarly immaterial as
well to the question of whether IHL applies. Rather, the question of whether a “resort to
force” in any particular circumstance triggers the application of IHL depends upon a
specific set of triggers contained in applicable IHL treaties, starting with the Geneva
Conventions and the Hague Regulations. These triggers depend first on the applicable
language of the relevant IHL treaty defining its application and, next, on whether the
fighting has reached some factually determined threshold level between the parties. 42
Very roughly, this requires either hostilities between two states or else, in the case of
non-state actors—such as in a civil war—fighting that is on-going, persistent, widespread, and organized. A resort to force might well raise an international law question of
whether it constitutes, on the one hand, an act of aggression or, on the other, a lawful
resort to self-defense. But that is a separate question from whether the particular resort to
force also invokes IHL as the law governing the conduct of that resort to force. Running
these two questions together leads to serious problems. The most serious is that what the
11

United States regards as lawful armed conflict might well be regarded by much of the rest
of the world as something close to simple murder.
The overall point for present purposes is that targeted killing against a non-state actor by
either the armed forces of a state or its civilian agents (such as the CIA) does not
automatically, by reason of the use of force alone, trigger the application of IHL. Nor
does the fact that since the African embassy bombings in the 1990s, the United States has
seen itself as in a state of armed conflict with al Qaeda and additionally, under the AUMF
and domestic court rulings, in an armed conflict with those responsible for the September
11 attacks.
At the moment, few in the United States seem much to care about this problem. After all,
the struggle with al Qaeda seems intuitively covered as an armed conflict under IHL, so
the distinction I’m making here and the concern I’m raising about the resulting legal
jeopardy for those engaged in carrying out or authorizing targeted killings must be a kind
of paper tiger, a remote law school hypothetical with no bearing on actual policy. But for
an administration committed to this strategic instrument to view the problem thus would
be a significant mistake. As the war extends into Pakistan, extends to targets beyond al
Qaeda “combatants” (whatever precisely that means), and into places such as Yemen or
Somalia, then these questions of whether targeted killings outside of legally cognizable
armed conflict can be legal reemerge, and in sometimes surprising ways. And they
emerge even more acutely if—when—at some point in the future, threats to the United
States do not come from al Qaeda at all but from some other group against whom
Congress has not passed an authorization for force buttressed by resolutions of the
Security Council. 43

The Stakes over Targeted Killing
Even accepting that there are two quite different meanings of “armed conflict,” is there
anything actually at stake here? I have suggested rather ominously that if the United
States does not move to protect and assert its long-held legal positions relative to
targeting killing, it stands to lose them. But is there any good reason to think this is true?
After all, the Obama Administration does not appear to see a problem with its legal
rationales. Neither did the Bush or Clinton Administrations before it. The war on terror,
they have all contended, is armed conflict on some theory or other.
But there are two problems here. The first is the long-term issue to which I earlier
alluded: Whether, in some future conflict unrelated to al Qaeda, situations might arise
that do not meet all definitions of armed conflict. The second is a more immediate
problem: A close look at the way international law is formulated and interpreted and the
manner in which it is developing suggests that even the Obama Administration’s current
targeted killing policies are likely to come under much greater pressure than recent
administrations have understood.
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Let’s start with what is now the standard view among the leading academic experts on the
subject of targeted killing. The scholarly community, as Mark Osiel accurately says, “is
almost entirely hostile to the practice, sanctioning it only under the most restrictive
conditions, of a sort that can virtually never be satisfied in practice.” 44 Nils Melzer’s
formidable treatise, Targeted Killing in International Law, 45 for example, starts from the
premise that the only two possible paradigms for addressing even the concept of targeted
killing are judicially-monitored law enforcement and armed conflict under IHL.
“[O]utside the conduct of hostilities,” he writes, “the extra-custodial killing of an
individual cannot be the actual purpose, but must remain the undesired and inevitable
consequence, of an operation absolutely necessary to achieve a different, legitimate
aim.” 46
By “hostilities” here, Melzer does not mean armed conflict in some colloquial sense—nor
in the sense of military action in a country’s self-defense. He means in the technical sense
of IHL. That this is the leading treatise’s premise, rather than its conclusion, gives some
sense of how far American domestic political views in the centrist political spectrum are
from the views of the “international law community,” of which Melzer’s views are
representative. This view alone, if adopted by the International Criminal Court or a
European magistrate with broad jurisdiction in human rights matters, could make
murderers and war criminals out of President Obama and any of the people working for
him on targeted killings. Far-fetched? A forthcoming Naval War College “Bluebook”
article remarks in passing that cross-border operations in Pakistan might potentially
expose “U.S. military personnel to international criminal liability.” 47
But the argument goes further and deeper. Indeed, the most insistently offered objections
are not simply definitional arguments about the words “armed conflict.” They also
involve human rights law and arise from the human rights claims of the individuals
targeted, generally under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). 48
The ICCPR is a core United Nations treaty in the protection of human rights, rooted in
the same process that led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 49 It is a broad
statement of civil and political rights in international law, and establishes a long series of
important guarantees related to physical and personal integrity—including guarantees
against arbitrary killing and extra-judicial execution. 50 The ICCPR is the fundamental—
although not the only—international human rights treaty that poses a challenge to the
practice of targeted killing, by finding it to be extrajudicial execution or something
similar. It has as of this writing at least 164 ratifications.
The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 but, like many countries, entered a number
of treaty reservations, understandings, and declarations that limit the application of its
terms in American conduct and law. 51 The United States has taken much criticism for
these steps, as well as for the fact that the Senate ratified the treaty with the express
understanding that it created no private rights of action to enforce its terms judicially. 52
Most important for purposes of targeted killing, the United States has never accepted that
the ICCPR applies extraterritorially—that is, that it regulates U.S. actions beyond its
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borders. 53 And it has always flatly rejected the application of the ICCPR in the setting of
armed conflict. Legal protection for the U.S. ability to use Predators depends in no small
part on preserving the American insistence, first, that the ICCPR does not apply
extraterritorially and, second, that it does not apply in IHL armed conflicts, in which IHL
substitutes as the legal regime in force, superseding ordinary human rights law.
The difficulties for American counterterrorism were the ICCPR conceded to apply
extraterritorially would be compounded immeasurably by the growing belief that human
rights law, and the ICCPR particularly, continue to apply in some fashion even during
hostilities. As with the definition of armed conflict, here too the American position is an
increasingly alienated one. The Organization of American States Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, for example, advanced the contrary position in recent
years in a report on U.S. counterterrorism. 54 Whether the United States will continue to
hold the line—and whether policymakers understand the stakes in holding the line with
respect to the Predator campaign in Pakistan and any other recourse to targeted killing in
the future—is far from clear. It is also unclear what the meaning of these human rights
standards is supposed to be in armed conflict. But from the standpoint of NGO advocates,
that lack of clarity is itself a virtue, allowing a game of post hoc bait-and-switch for the
legal rules on nearly any topic in armed conflict and a way to always reach a result one
likes.
Congress and the Obama Administration will come under considerable pressure to cede
this ground, because from the standpoint of advocates, access to the ICCPR, whether
extraterritorially or within the United States, particularly in judicial proceedings, offers
the much-sought human rights advocate’s dream of an end-run around inconvenient (if
democratically-enacted) U.S. domestic law. These advocates, it bears emphasis, are not
marginal people. For example, Harold Koh, slated to become State Department legal
advisor, signed a letter in 2008 stating that the ICCPR applies to armed conflict and
implying that it must apply extraterritorially as well. 55 And in his confirmation
proceedings following his nomination to the State Department, he conspicuously did not
retract this view of extraterritorial application—stating merely that he looked forward to
reviewing the American position in the interagency process. 56
Response to American practice on the part of human rights groups and international
organizations has largely tracked the scholarly theoretical consensus. In response to the
killing of Haitham al-Yemeni with a CIA Predator strike in Pakistan in 2005, Amnesty
International said that, assuming the facts as it described them, the “USA has carried out
an extrajudicial execution, in violation of international law.” Amnesty believes that the
governments of the “USA and Pakistan should have cooperated to arrest Haitham alYemeni rather than kill him.” The fundamental reason it gave was that whether or not this
was part of an armed conflict, international human rights law continued to apply to this
situation. 57 Amnesty takes the position, in other words, that human rights law—including
broad rights against arbitrary killing and guaranteeing due process—should have applied
in this instance irrespective of whether it was an armed conflict or not. It is hard to see
the circumstances in which a targeted killing could be permissible under such a standard,
which is precisely Amnesty’s point.
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Similarly, very few people in the United States, regardless of political persuasion, would
regard the Predator strike in Yemen on November 3, 2002—which killed six people,
including a senior member of al Qaeda, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, in a vehicle on the
open road—as anything other than a good thing, regardless of how one characterizes it
legally. Yet the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions described it as a “clear case of extrajudicial killing.” 58 The legal analysis
followed that held by Amnesty International and many others—to wit, that it does not
matter whether the targeted killing takes place in armed conflict or not, nor how the
United States justifies it legally, because international human rights law continues to
apply no matter what and to require that the governments involved seek to arrest, rather
than to kill.
A subsequent U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
summarized his office’s view in 2004: “Empowering Governments to identify and kill
‘known terrorists’ places no verifiable obligation upon them to demonstrate in any way
that those against whom lethal force is used are indeed terrorists, or to demonstrate that
every other alternative had been exhausted.” 59 Once again, it is hard to see how targeted
killing as a policy could survive in any form with such a legal characterization.
Various European allies have been extremely hostile toward the practice. Swedish
Foreign Minister Anna Lindh was among the most outspoken critics of the U.S. targeting
of al-Harethi in November 2002. She described the operation as “a summary execution
that violated human rights…Even terrorists must be treated according to international
law. Otherwise any country can start executing those whom they consider terrorists.” 60
The criticism is even stronger when the actor is Israel—which undertakes targeted killing
in keeping with the peculiarly long-term, “mixed” war-security and intelligence-law
enforcement nature of its struggle—and, incidentally, with far more procedural
protections than the United States uses, including judicial review. Then the gloves come
off completely in expressions of international hostility to the practice. 61
To be clear, under the standards these groups are articulating, these practices are regarded
as crimes by a sizable and influential part of the international community. This is so
whether or not these acts are currently reachable by any particular tribunal. As the
coercive interrogation debate shows, with Spain and other countries considering
prosecutions in their own courts, the trend is toward an expansion of jurisdiction of such
tribunals. And America’s claim that these are killings of combatants in an armed conflict
governed by either self-defense or IHL does not cut much ice against the views of those
who either reject the armed conflict claim outright or else claim that even in armed
conflict, human rights standards will apply.
American officials seem to believe that by appealing to the detailed and specific
requirements of IHL on the formal and technical definition of combatancy as an apparent
condition of finding a lawful target, they have done an especially good and rigorous
parsing of the legal requirements. As far as the international law community is
concerned, however, the combatancy standard is not some especially rigorous approach
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that shows how concerned a party is for international law. To the contrary, it is by
definition a relaxation of the ordinary standard of international human rights law,
including prohibitions on murder and extrajudicial killing—and it can only be justified by
the existence of an armed conflict that meets the definitions of IHL treaties.
At times it appears that the United States government has little idea how much its
concession of formal requirements of combatancy concedes. Yet when the United States
argues that it’s okay to target someone because he is a combatant, it effectively concedes
that the conflict must meet the definition of an IHL conflict for such an attack to be
legitimate. By contrast, what the United States needs, and its historic position has
asserted, is a claim that self-defense has an existence as a doctrine apart from IHL armed
conflict that can justify the use of force against an individual. The United States has long
assumed, then-Legal Adviser to the State Department Abraham Sofaer stated in 1989,
that the “inherent right of self defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force,
and that it extends to any group or State that can properly be regarded as responsible for
such activities.” 62
To put the matter simply, the international law community does not accept targeted
killings even against al Qaeda, even in a struggle directly devolving from September 11,
even when that struggle is backed by U.N. Security Council resolutions authorizing force,
even in the presence of a near-declaration of war by Congress in the form of the AUMF,
and even given the widespread agreement that the U.S. was both within its inherent rights
and authorized to undertake military action against the perpetrators of the attacks. If
targeted killing in which the international community agreed so completely to a military
response against terrorism constitutes extrajudicial execution, how would it be seen in
situations down the road, after and beyond al Qaeda, and without the obvious condition
of an IHL armed conflict and all these legitimating authorities?
In the view of much of the international law community, a targeted killing can only be
something other than an extrajudicial execution—that is, a murder—if
• It takes place in an armed conflict;
• The armed conflict is an act of self-defense within the meaning of the UN
Charter, and
• It is also an armed conflict within the meaning of IHL; and finally,
• Even if it is an armed conflict under IHL, the circumstances must not permit
application of international human rights law, which would require an attempt to
arrest rather than targeting to kill.
As a practical matter, these conditions would forbid all real-world targeted killings.
As we now turn to see, the United States has never accepted these criteria. The result is
that a strategic centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism policy rests upon legal grounds
regarded as deeply illegal—extrajudicial killing is one of the most serious violations of
international human rights, after all, as well it should be—by large and influential parts of
the international community. The change of administration from Bush to Obama gives
some protection to the policy, but not likely for all of the Obama term and still less likely
beyond it. We turn now from how the international law community sees targeted killing
to U.S. views of the subject under both international and domestic law.
16

The American View of Targeted Killings
How does the United States legally justify its targeted killing practices today? This is not
an easy question to answer definitively, because much of the legal analysis and
background is not public. Even where one gets hints, through Justice Department
opinions made public, for example, one does not know if the entire record is on the table,
and what facts, still under wraps, lawyers might have relied upon in their legal analyses.
Drawing on publicly available information and some informal, anecdotal discussions
with former government officials, however, we might hazard some assumptions about
current legal policy.
Beginning apparently with the Clinton Administration, when the intelligence community
first became aware of the threat from al Qaeda, the United States has seemed to justify at
least some of its targeted killings by treating them as armed conflict by dint of their being
acts of self-defense but then additionally asserting that the person in question is a lawful
target under IHL. The legal rationale appears to conflate the questions of resort to force
and armed conflict under IHL. The determination thus appears to become whether the
target qualifies as a “combatant” who may be targeted under IHL. The fundamental
difficulty with this approach is that it conflates the general customary obligations of
necessity and proportionality under the international law of self-defense with the treatyspecific definition of a combatant under IHL. As I have explained, these obligations share
certain roots but are not the same.
For example, the 9/11 Commission reported that the Clinton Administration justified
legally an (ultimately abortive) operation to kill bin Laden in Afghanistan in 2000 on
grounds that “under the law of armed conflict, killing a person who posed an imminent
threat to the United States would be an act of self-defense, not an assassination.” 63
During this period of time, of course, the United States was clearly not in a state of armed
conflict in Afghanistan, and the incident predated the AUMF as well. While the rationale
here invokes self-defense, it then turns to invoke the “law of armed conflict” without,
however, specifying whether it is the law of resort to force or the IHL law of conduct of
hostilities. Indeed, it is not clear whether the rationale treats a person who poses an
“imminent threat” as a combatant who may be targeted per se—IHL would on its own
terms impose a more exacting analysis of combatancy and “direct participation in
hostilities”—but certainly the framework runs the risk of rationale by circular fiat: if we
regard the person as an imminent threat, the person becomes by that fact alone a
combatant.
Discussions with former officials suggest that successive administrations have not
considered this to be a problem. “Why not?” they ask. The method of legal rationale
appears to have been, from the 1990s until today: “We know we have been in a state of
armed conflict with al Qaeda, whether under self-defense or IHL, so it does not really
matter which one. Developments since September 11 have confirmed all this through the
AUMF and Security Council resolutions and much else besides. So the question is really
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moot whether it is the law of resort to force and self-defense, or instead IHL and
standards of combatancy. We have an armed conflict, so why worry about the question of
whether it is based on one body of law or another?”
The real issue—one emphasized in these informal conversations—seems to be that
without a basis for targeting directed against a “combatant,” the targeted killing would
become an “assassination.” As discussed below, assassinations are specifically prohibited
by U.S. domestic regulations, and they are legally separate from the international law
questions of extrajudicial execution. If this is the proper way of interpreting assassination
under American domestic law, then the effect is to force the U.S. into a legal analysis
based around combatancy.
This framework for legally analyzing targeted killing decisions has the virtue of taking
advantage of the fact of broad—although far from universal—agreement that America is
at war with al Qaeda in some sense. Although discomfort with this paradigm might ripen
eventually to the point of making individuals potentially liable for authorizing
extrajudicial executions under the guise of the laws of armed conflict, we have not yet
reached that point. So the path of least resistance over the past fifteen years works for
now to some degree. But it will not work either if the international law community’s view
of the subject gains further traction, particularly in the context of states or tribunals that
claim universal jurisdiction over human rights violations, or if the United States feels
compelled to take on targets with whom it is not as clearly at war as it is with al Qaeda.

Targeted Killing as Self-Defense?
As I have already let on, the proper international legal rationale for targeted killing is
self-defense, not that the target is a combatant under IHL. Unfortunately, self-defense is
one of the most contested issues in all of public international law. The U.N. Charter says,
at Article 2(4), that all member-states shall “refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state.” It also goes on to say, at Article 51, that nothing in the present Charter shall
“impair the inherent right of individual…self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations.” As readers are likely well aware, the potential conflicts
between these two articles (as well as the potential conflicts and interpretive issues,
especially with respect to the meaning of “armed attack” and the “inherent” right of selfdefense under customary law, long predate the Charter) fill whole libraries of
commentary. In this discussion, I confine myself strictly to the question of how a targeted
killing might be viewed with respect to self-defense. 64 Even so, the question remains
alarmingly broad, on account of the fact that targeted killing is an activity on the cusp of
perhaps the most difficult practical issue of self-defense: preemption and prevention and
anticipatory self-defense. 65
There are many views on this question and nearly endless controversies. But in the longstanding U.S. view, self-defense encompasses at least three categories:
• Self-defense against an actual use of force or hostile act;
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• “Preemptive self defense against an imminent use of force;” and
• “Self defense against a continuing threat.”
These categories of U.S. interpretation are not new. 66 Senior Department of Defense law
of war lawyer Hays Parks noted them, for example, in a memorandum on assassinations
back in 1989, long before the emergence of al Qaeda or the circumstances of September
11. 67 Broadly speaking, the United States grounds its customary law views concerning
anticipatory self-defense on the so-called Caroline Doctrine, which permits such actions
but also limits them to circumstances in which the “necessity of self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” 68 Despite
the apparent restrictiveness of the Caroline language, and despite the fact that many
international law commentators regard it has having been superseded or at least severely
curtailed by the U.N. Charter, it has served as a source of evolving state practice for the
United States view since before the Civil War down to the present day, and has been seen
as a source of legal justification for preemptive and preventative self-defense. One
corollary of the long-standing American interpretation (but widely reflected in the views
and state practice of other states since 1945) of self-defense is that, notwithstanding the
apparent literal language of Article 51, no “armed attack” need have occurred “before a
state may use force to counter a threat.” 69
Moreover, as Parks also noted, the United States has always interpreted international law
(including the Caroline Doctrine) so as to allow it to respond to the emergence of new
kinds of threats. 70 These interpretations include the self-defense right to respond to nonstate actors, such as al Qaeda (indeed, the Caroline Doctrine originally concerned a nonstate actor at the U.S.-Canadian border in 1837). And the United States also appears to
have accepted some evolving version of what has sometimes been called the
“accumulation of events” or “active defense” view of anticipatory self-defense—a
variation of the category of “self-defense against a continuing threat.” As one scholar
describes this “active defense” view:
A state may use past practices of terrorist groups and past instances of aggression
as evidence of a recurring threat. In light of this threat, a state may invoke [the
right of self defense]…if there is sufficient reason to believe that a pattern of
aggression exists. What may appear to be retaliation is quite often an “active
defense” in which a state uses past terrorist acts to justify launching preemptive
strikes. Advocates of this theory believe that it offers a much more practical
response to a terrorist threat; in effect, a state will no longer need to wait until it is
attacked before it may use force. 71
This theory unsurprisingly suffered something in prestige when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
turned out not to have weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, it remains the legal
view of the United States, particularly with regard to terrorist non-state-actors. It almost
unquestionably remains the view of the Obama Administration, which has been notably
slow formally to relinquish legal powers of counterterrorism exercised under the Bush
Administration. The legal policy of the United States has remained remarkably stable on
this topic; as Hays Parks stated in 1989, the right of self-defense would support direct
attack—and we can add, targeted killing—on terrorist leaders when “their actions pose a
continuing threat to U.S. citizens or the national security of the United States.” 72 That is
not narrow language, and it was not devised after September 11 or by the Bush
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Administration, but was an accurate statement of American policy in the 1980s. Through
the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration, and down into the Obama
Administration today, some version of self-defense has remained the true, if sometimes
obfuscated, underlying legal rationale for targeted killings.
What does this mean for targeted killing under international law, under long-standing
U.S. views? Three things primarily: First, the United States accepts as a matter of
international law that a targeted killing requires justification in some fashion as selfdefense in order to be a legal resort to force. Second, however, the American view of
international law governing self-defense is pragmatic, flexible, and changes over time to
meet new circumstances. Third and crucially from the standpoint of protecting the
American legal position, the question of whether something plausibly constitutes selfdefense is debated by many different “communities of interpretation” of international
law, including states, congeries of states, academics and non-governmental organizations,
the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the International Court of Justice. That
said, the United States is entitled to assert its own interpretation of international law
should it choose to make the effort to do so—and provided it is willing to bear possible
substantial international diplomatic costs. That requires, however, being willing to assert
it and reassert it over time, to announce a view and to act upon that view.
The trouble, once again, is that much of the world sees the American right of self-defense
far more narrowly. Important actors in the community of international law do not even
accept that the situations in which the United States has undertaken targeted killing in, for
example, Pakistan constitute legitimate self-defense under the U.N. Charter. For example,
the eminent international law scholar Sean D. Murphy has a forthcoming article in the
influential U.S. Naval War College’s International Law Studies journal expressing grave
and careful concern that, in the absence of meaningful consent by the government of
Pakistan, a broad “right of self-defense against al Qaeda targets in Pakistan based on the
attacks of 9/11, however, is…problematic, since the requirements of necessity and
proportionality likely preclude unilateral uses of force against a third State that was not
implicated in those attacks.” 73
The gap between U.S. needs and consequent views of self-defense and the views of the
international law community is probably unbridgeable. But this is not a case of the
United States versus the rest of the world. There are, rather, a sizable number of states
that have to worry about the possibility of enemies using havens in third countries,
shielded by claims of that third country’s sovereignty. It is a delicate dance in
international law; no one wants to say too much one way or the other, and when actual
instances of state practice occur, very often the reaction is a discreet silence. Thus,
leaving aside the United States or Israel, Murphy notes that Turkey has undertaken
“various cross-border operations against the Kurdish separatist guerrilla
organization…without being condemned by the Security Council, General Assembly, or
[the] International Court.” 74 When in 2008 Colombia attacked FARC guerrilla camps
across the border in Ecuador, none of the “principal organizations of the United Nations
criticized the action; while the Organization of American States adopted a resolution
declaring the Colombian raid to be a violation of Ecuador’s sovereignty, the OAS
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stopped short of expressly condemning Colombia.” 75 Two judges of the International
Court of Justice each stated in separate opinions in the 2005 case Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo that if the ICJ still endorses a literal reading of Article 51, limiting
self-defense to an attack by another state, then the ICJ is no longer consistent with either
state practice or the practice of the Security Council. 76
In other words, it is important not to see the U.S. on this point as some solitary outlier
from other states. The gap, rather, lies with the influential, loose body of “soft-law”
opinion-makers, activists, academics, and commentators. And the tension here is neither
surprising nor necessarily unhealthy. The United States will always have a need to make
these kinds of flexible decisions about national security. And the dynamic will always
and forever be that middling state powers, emerging great powers, outright enemies,
idealistic NGOs, United Nations functionaries, law professors and intellectuals, and other
such actors will seek to leverage their influence by using the rhetoric of international law
to constrain U.S. flexibility in exactly this regard.
With respect to international law, therefore, the U.S. justification for the legality of a
particular targeted killing should focus on self-defense as the basis, irrespective of
whether or not there is also an armed conflict under IHL underway that might provide a
further basis. Conceding over time that targeted killing can be distinguished from
extrajudicial execution only if it is part of an armed conflict under IHL will subject the
United States to requirements that, in fact, it has not traditionally accepted as a matter of
international law but will find difficult to reverse in circumstances in which the definition
of an armed conflict under IHL has not been met. The U.S. will receive plenty of
pushback just on the question of what constitutes its legitimate self-defense under
international law in this area. It buys itself only additional constraints if it also allows the
international law of self-defense to run together with the law governing the conduct of
hostilities.

American Domestic Regulation of Targeted Killing
Modern U.S. statutory authority for non-law enforcement exercises of force by
“intelligence” actors begins with the National Security Act of 1947 that created the CIA
and granted it authority to engage in a wide variety of intelligence activities. The 1947
Act also authorized the performance of “additional services of common concern” and
“such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as
the President or the National Security Council may direct.” 77
The reference to “other functions and duties” —commonly termed the ‘Fifth Function’—
is deliberately obscure. But as foreign relations legal scholar Phillip Trimble observes,
the breadth of known incidents under the Fifth Function is sufficient to suggest that “the
executive branch has interpreted the legislative mandate broadly and Congress has
regularly acquiesced.” 78 During the 1960s, for example, these included assistance to
overthrow governments in Iran and Guatemala; assistance in attempts to “assassinate
leaders in Cuba, Chile, and Zaire;” support for “civil wars in Iraq and Laos;” and an
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“invasion of Cuba.” 79 Although one might characterize some number of these activities
as having taken place as part of armed conflicts, the characterization would not apply to
them all. In any case, the United States was not participating as a party to these conflicts
where they existed. Whether rightly or wrongly, justly or unjustly, the United States has
often used force, not under color of law enforcement or in the context of IHL armed
conflicts to which the U.S. was a party, but instead under domestic statutory authority.
The point, for our purposes, is that legal or not under international law of self-defense,
those early Cold War interventions were undertaken on an understanding that there was a
valid basis in international and domestic law for uses of force apart from, and short of,
war in an IHL sense. And, moreover, that these uses of force might be carried out by
civilian agents, rather than regular armed forces, of the United States. Notwithstanding
the reforms that have strengthened Congressional oversight and other watchdog functions
over the past several decades, nothing in the basic statutory arrangement challenges this
fundamental assumption that U.S. domestic law permits in certain circumstances the uses
of force, including targeted killing, by civilian agents of the government in circumstances
that implicate self-defense under international law but do not necessarily constitute an
IHL armed conflict.
The domestic law governing the “intelligence community” changed dramatically in the
1970s, largely because these covert uses-of-force came to light and were found by many
to be wrong, imprudent, unjust, or unjustified under claims of self-defense or imperative
national security. Watergate-era congressional hearings in 1974 resulted, among other
things, in funding restrictions on intelligence activities under the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. 80 This amendment, combined with
the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, laid down the basic pattern of post-Watergate
domestic law restrictions on “covert” actions, including those that involve the use or
threat of use of force: 81
• Intelligence agencies had to seek and receive a presidential finding before
undertaking any such operation;
• the President had to be informed of it;
• the substantive standard for such actions was that “each such operation is
important to the national security of the United States”;
• the President had to report on each operation “in a timely fashion,” although not
necessarily in advance, to the intelligence committee of each house of Congress;
• Congress could express its will in current or future funding. 82
In this statutory and regulatory arrangement for the conduct of intelligence activities,
Congress left deliberately vague what constitutes an operation covered by the statute.
The use of force is not explicitly mentioned at all, although it is unquestionably
understood. The statute glosses over thorny U.S. domestic law issues of separation of
powers. But while the fundamental constitutional issues, Michael Reisman notes, remain
inconclusively resolved, there is no ambiguity on the authority to engage in covert action.
“[I]f there was any doubt regarding the statutory basis for covert action, the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment…and Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 removed it.” 83
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This regime contains no suggestion that these operations, insofar as they use force,
legally can only take place as part of an armed conflict within the meaning of
international humanitarian law. Indeed, the first statutory definition of “covert action”
offered in 1991 in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, refers very
obliquely to covert uses of force. “Covert action,” under the statute, means activities to
“influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the
role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” It
specifically does not include activities the “primary purpose of which is to acquire
intelligence.” 84 Moreover, covert action is defined not to include either “traditional
diplomatic or military activities or routine support to those activities…[or] traditional law
enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies
or routine support to such activities…” 85 It is an attempt to regulate and to require
oversight of—including the possibility of Congress refusing to fund—covert actions,
including such uses of force as the 1984 mining of Nicaraguan harbors, not to legislate
them out of existence.
Moreover, reforms of intelligence actions in the past three decades have been
overwhelmingly concerned with oversight particularly of peacetime (that is, not in an
IHL armed conflict) covert uses of force—presumably because Congress was most
concerned that peacetime operations would be less scrutinized than operations conducted
as part of an acknowledged armed conflict in which the existence of the conflict was
plain and the application of law of war standards was clear. Hence, the exception in the
statute for “traditional” military activities, such as open, overt war. At this moment, an
important intragovernmental debate is underway as to whether various Predator strikes in
Pakistan constitute “covert” activities that, notwithstanding their connection to the
ongoing war, are nonetheless covered by the statute, or whether instead they are part of
the “traditional” activities of the military in conducting war. Whatever the correct answer,
no one in that debate is questioning that the fundamental category is covert operations
that might take place either in the context of an IHL armed conflict or else as part of an
operation justified by the doctrine of self-defense.

The U.S. Assassination Ban
The American law that most closely addresses targeted killing outside of armed conflict
is not a statute. In the Church committee hearings in Congress in the mid-1970s, the
CIA’s role in various assassination attempts in earlier years became public and a matter
of widespread outrage. In the public uproar that followed, the Ford Administration issued
an Executive Order banning U.S. government employees from engaging in or conspiring
to engage in political assassination. 86 This order was repeated in slightly varying
language by President Carter 87 —who unaccountably dropped the word “political” —and
finally reissued in the form still in force today, Executive Order 12333 by President
Reagan. The pertinent section reads: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the
United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” 88
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This brief sentence has occasioned considerable scholarship and other commentary, much
of it learned and ingenious, intended to interpret and reinterpret the provision. The
Executive Order, after all, provides no definition of assassination, and the materials
collateral to the three versions of the order shed little if any authoritative light on what it
is supposed to mean. The issue has been repeatedly on the table for the obvious reason
that, interpreted as widely as it might be, Executive Order 12333 would appear to
preclude the targeting of the head of a hostile state who was, for example, the commander
in chief of enemy armed forces and otherwise a legal target. The order does not
distinguish between wartime and peacetime either, between armed conflict governed by
IHL targeting standards or anything else.
Commentators have suggested various ways of reading the ban. The Church committee
was focused upon the shocking revelations of CIA participation in plots against foreign
leaders in peacetime; “peacetime” was specifically mentioned by President Ford in
suggesting contemporaneously his support for legislation banning assassination of
foreign officials. A Congressional Research Service report suggests that “assassination
may be viewed as an intentional killing of a targeted individual for political purposes.”
Many others, however, have argued, in part based on the focus of the Church committee
hearings, that assassination as understood in American usage connotes attacks directed at
political leaders—and terrorists are not political leaders. Still others have noted that the
term carries a sense of covertness and treachery, and not merely surprise. And still others
have argued that acts of self-defense—including armed conflict undertaken within the
legal meaning of self-defense, and including surprise attacks as part of self-defense—are
outside the scope of the assassination ban. The United States government has expressed
official views, however. The view of Legal Adviser to the State Department under
Reagan, Abraham Sofaer, for example, was that assassination was not merely a killing
with a political motive or aimed against a political leader, but that it also independently
had to be a “murder” in the first place. Sofaer noted that “virtually all available
definitions of ‘assassination’ include the word ‘murder’…a crime[;] that element is the
most fundamental aspect of the assassination prohibition.” Thus, under “no
circumstances” should assassination be defined to include any otherwise “lawful
homicide.” 89 Unlawfulness, in the State Department view of the 1980s, and apparently
not contravened by later pronouncements, is a necessary prior element of an
assassination.
Actual U.S. state practice since the issuance of the Reagan order strongly supports a
narrow reading of it, including the narrowing view that to violate the Executive Order,
the homicide must have been independently unlawful. Not long after the issuance of the
Executive Order, after all, President Reagan in 1986 ordered a retaliatory air strike
against Libya. According to press accounts, and seeming to eschew locutions about
attacking a military target that might merely collaterally include the Libyan president
Muammar Qadaffi—the President said that the attack was aimed at Qadaffi personally, in
order to try and kill him. 90 The First Gulf War, and the more recent Iraq and Afghanistan
wars all saw efforts at “decapitation” strikes aimed at the leadership of enemy regimes,
for impeccable military reasons—but as well on humanitarian grounds that the leadership
is a legitimate target in war and that killing a regime’s leaders might bring war to a close
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without great loss of non-leadership life. 91 These actions are all in the course of armed
conflict governed by IHL—since they constituted state-to-state hostilities covered by the
formal terms of Article 2 common to the Geneva Conventions, and in each case the
political leadership were regarded without controversy as legitimate targets of attack.
Predator strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and other places where IHL might or might not
apply to the use of force have not been considered by the former Bush Administration or
the Obama Administration to contravene the order or to require its modification or
revocation, supporting the view that they see it as narrow in the ways that Sofaer
announced as U.S. policy in 1989.
The best reading of the Executive Order at this point in time is to say that, without further
definition, it is a ban co-extensive with pre-existing U.S. obligations under international
law. Sofaer suggests as much when he says that examination of international “laws of
war also supports limiting the assassination prohibition to illegal killing”—but then
carefully makes clear that illegal killing does not include the lawful exercise of the right
of self-defense under international law. 92 And, with respect to domestic law,
assassination is a term of art referring to a form of already-illegal murder, gradually
unfolding in U.S. state practice, 93 but, in any event, not something that should be
construed “in a manner that inhibits the lawful exercises of lethal force.” 94
All that said, the assassination ban seems to operate as a principal analytic constraint on
targeted killings outside of the context of IHL armed conflict. When government lawyers
worry about the lawfulness of a proposed targeted killing, their concern seems not to be
about the IHL definition of armed conflict. Rather, it appears to focus on whether the
killing qualifies as an assassination or not. Recourse to the position of the State
Department in 1989 urges that this focus is the wrong one. Moreover, embracing extra
and unnecessary justifications to avoid the possibility that an exercise of lethal force
might be characterized as an assassination under criteria that are far wider than the State
Department’s view of an already-illegal killing gradually weakens the position of the
United States on targeting in self-defense.

Pressure on the American Position
To all of this, the Obama Administration might ask a resounding “So what?” These
human rights and other issues might exist in some hypothetical counterterrorism
campaign far in the future if some administration were prepared to sign on to readings of
international law the United States has always rejected. But for now, in the fight against
al Qaeda, we have the AUMF, and we don’t accede to the more extravagant arguments of
the international human rights community. The result is that targeted killings are
governed by IHL. We are only using them when the conditions of self-defense have all
been met. And those facts also conveniently get us around the assassination ban. Perhaps
someone might raise some legal difficulty over operating in parts of Pakistan and over
targeting parties not clearly related to al Qaeda. But practically, it all seems like the same
“armed conflict.” So whatever the problems that might exist legally tomorrow, we do not
have a legal difficulty today.
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That even the Bush Administration always treated its targeted killings as the targeting of
combatants covered by the AUMF in a war covered by IHL says something about the
pressures the American legal structure faces from actors in the international legal
community. Those pressures are unlikely to abate. For the current American view of its
authority to conduct targeted killings, as described above, is barely more palatable to key
elements of the international community than the one I advocate. What’s more,
seemingly innocuous changes in and acquiescence to various legal regimes and rules
could end up undermining the American legal rationale for targeted killings. The United
States, to cite only one example, would like to have a more productive engagement with
the International Criminal Court; this would put a considerable premium on the definition
of the crime of “aggression” in that tribunal.
Some of the long term international legal pressure turns on a fundamental difference in
understanding concerning how international law works—a difference that sometimes has
a strong effect on interpretive outcome. In the long-held American view, international
law classically binds sovereign states through their consent, either contractually through
explicit treaties or implicitly through their assent to gradually evolving customary law.
By contrast, those seeking to constrain states or alter their behavior beyond their consent
have an incentive to expand the canon of what is implicitly agreed to by states, and
generally binding on all of them, in the form of this body of customary international
law. 95 Since custom is not limited to the explicit terms of a ratified treaty, it is open to
expansive restatement, interpretation, and invention by a wide variety of actors, both
governmental and non-governmental. Classically, customary law has been evidenced
principally by the actual behavior of states—functioning to ensure that international law
does not over time become a purely paper enterprise with terms departing further and
further from what states actually do. What is not prohibited to states, however, is
generally permissible for them. So on this view, the question of targeted killing is not
whether it is affirmatively allowed, but instead whether some treaty provision, or some
genuinely accepted customary rule, prohibits it.
These traditional underpinnings of international law are, however, contested in the
contemporary world as the “ownership” of international law—who sets its terms,
interprets its rules, determines its content and meaning—is no longer entirely in the hands
of sovereign states. Other actors—international advocacy organizations, international
tribunals, international organizations and their functionaries, professors and academics,
middle-weight states that see international law as a means to constrain more powerful
sovereign states—play a significant role in setting the terms of the meaning and
interpretation of international law. And while it’s easy now for the American
administration to pretend these currents don’t exist, they have a way of seeping in as real
constraints on American practice.
The stakes are higher than American policymakers appear to realize—as even a cursory
look back over the past few years should make plain. At the most overt level, there is the
possibility of prosecution abroad based on a consensus view of international law that the
United States rejects. No one who has watched the European eagerness to initiate
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criminal and civil proceedings against Israeli and American officials in ever-proliferating
judicial forums can be entirely sanguine about a giant gulf between American and
international understanding of a practice that the international law community regards as
murder. 96 The more aggressively the United States uses this instrument, the more glaring
the gulf will become—until, in some jurisdiction, someone decides to assert the
consensus view as operative law. Absent some aggressive effort to defend the American
position, that magistrate or prosecutor will have the overwhelming weight of international
legal opinion behind him.
But the problem for the United States is not limited to the possibility of criminal
proceedings abroad. American courts themselves are far from immune to the influence of
soft law development. Consider only the manner in which American detention policy has
been affected by parallel currents of international law opinion imported into American
law through Supreme Court opinions. Only seven years ago, an American administration
took a “so what” attitude toward international law ferment over detention that was rather
similar to the current consensus on targeted killings. International legal scholars, NGOs,
international organizations, and most countries took a far more restrictive view of the
detention authority residing in IHL—specifically with respect to the protections due to
unlawful enemy combatants—than did the United States, which had quietly preserved but
not fought aggressively for a different approach over the preceding decades. The
Supreme Court, however, has now gone a considerable distance to bridge the gulf by
insisting that at least a portion of the Geneva Conventions covers all detainees. Whatever
one thinks of that judgment, it is a striking example of the capacity to impact American
law of the sort of international legal developments we are now seeing with respect to
targeted killing.
More broadly, there are hidden but important costs when the United States is perceived
by the rest of the world to be acting illegally. For one thing, it limits the willingness and
capacity of other countries to assist American efforts. Detention here again offers a
striking example; virtually no other country has assisted in American detention
operations since September 11 in large part because of concerns over its legality. The
more heavily and aggressively the United States banks on a policy that a strong
consensus regards as per se criminal, the more tension it can expect in efforts to garner
other countries’ and organizations’ cooperation in counterterrorism efforts. Absent a
strong effort to establish the legitimacy of current American practice, this too, over time,
will push the United States away from it.
The Obama foreign policy team may assume that the world’s goodwill toward the new
administration means acceptance over time of these actions. That is surely mistaken. The
admirable, if mistaken, views of international law scholars and the international law
community on how human rights law should apply universally did not develop because
Obama’s predecessor was named Bush—and they won’t melt in the face of affection for
a popular new president. Over the long run, if the Obama Administration wants to
continue to fight using more discriminating, precisely-targeted weapons instead of fullscale combat, it’s going to have to confront this problem while it still has intellectual and
legal maneuvering space.
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Legitimate Concerns
The concerns that underlie all of this international law ferment—chiefly, mistaken
targeting decisions and excessive collateral damage—are real and substantial. A wholly
justified worry about targeted killing, particularly as offered here, is that it is a defense of
the practice without offering anything in the way of standards for its effective regulation.
If Congress and the administration wish to maintain and defend the legitimacy of this
category of violence and to demonstrate that it is not unlimited or unregulated and exists
within bounds, the question of visible domestic standards requires attention. Indeed, the
reach to situate this activity under the law of IHL armed conflict is, in its substance, a
reach to standards of proportionality, discrimination in targeting, and minimizing
collateral damage.
It would be a profound mistake, as I have argued, to formally adopt such standards on the
mistaken view that they must apply as a matter of a particular regime of international law
that has its own triggers for when it applies as a matter of law. Treating these standards as
binding law for their own sake, rather than useful and appropriate policy standards,
would be an unwelcome additional invitation to war crimes prosecutions by other states
and international tribunals against those engaged in key missions.
The standards that do apply as a matter of binding customary law of self-defense are, as
noted, necessity and proportionality, even applied to the conduct of self-defense
operations. In seeking ways to operationalize those two legal requirements, it is highly
relevant to look to IHL standards, even if they do not apply as law as such. The minimum
proportionality calculation, for example, with respect to collateral damage should begin
with the classic IHL formulation weighing military advantage against innocent third party
damage, and certainly should not drop below that. These are areas in which existing
standards developed in IHL are highly persuasive as a policy matter and in informing the
content of customary law of the conduct of self-defense operations. Congress and the
administration should move to address these valid concerns about substantive
standards—yet without taking steps that offer an implied invitation for international
bodies or other states to treat the activities as potential war crimes under their
jurisdiction. The U.S. government should also recognize that its ability to sustain such
programs over the long term depends in considerable part on keeping technology moving
forward to greater discrimination in targeting—and that requires research and
development.
The elephant in the room, so to speak, however, is the standard by which American
forces select targets in the first place. This is the core objection to the whole practice, for
example, raised by UN special rapporteurs and many others—on what basis does the U.S.
conclude that this person is a terrorist? While the substantive standard governing conduct
to evaluate a potential targeted killing in relation to innocent third party collateral damage
is best drawn from standards in the law of IHL armed conflict, target selection in targeted
killing is an intelligence matter. And although military intelligence has much to offer in
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the way of methodology, military law has much less so. Yet the intelligence community,
for many reasons, has had only limited success in picking targets since 9/11—although
the quality of target selection in the current campaign of Predator strikes by the CIA in
Pakistan has clearly gone up. Congress can impose more demands for information to the
intelligence committees and greater monitoring of target selection either before or after
an attack, but it faces great limits in doing more than that. Congress cannot make the
intelligence judgments.
The concerns over targeted killings are not, of course, limited to targeting and collateral
damage questions. Other states, particularly friendly and allied states, have excellent
reason to view these policies with political alarm—quite apart from their abstract legal
assessments of them. Britain, for example, has a certain number of radical imams who
appear directly to influence their followers, among other things, to take up jihad in
Pakistan and Afghanistan against the U.S. and NATO allies. 97 In purely hypothetical
terms, the U.S. might do well to target and kill them in Britain. While the U.S. is
obviously not going to do that, it will target al Qaeda with Yemen’s consent in Yemen,
and there are circumstances in which it will target terrorist suspects without territorial
state consent.
What we seek, that being the case, are policy standards that distinguish between two
distinct, prototypical situations. On the one hand, policy should unashamedly permit the
use of Predators and Hellfire missiles against the leadership of a terrorist organization
under, for example, the following conditions: The group poses a grave threat to the
United States; its leadership is safely ensconced in a failed state somewhere; a state of
armed conflict within the meaning of IHL may or may not exist; seeking to obtain
custody or extradition or other “ordinary” measures will not only be unavailing, it will tip
off the targets; the administration has concluded that it cannot undertake another full
scale military assault, least of all for the purpose of killing a discrete, small group of
terrorists. This describes Afghanistan under the Taliban, of course, but it captures (as the
Obama campaign correctly recognized) even more accurately Pakistan and its trajectory
today, with all the policy unpleasantness that it implies.
On the other hand, we certainly want a rule that prohibits the 1978 “poisoned-tip
umbrella” killing of Bulgarian defector Georgi Markov by Bulgarian State Security
agents on the streets of London 98 or the still-disputed account of the 2006 poisoning of
former Russian FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko, also in London, by alleged Russian
government agents. 99 These latter cases would surely be covered by the assassination ban
were they hypothetical U.S. operations, not to mention not remotely cases of “selfdefense”—though the cases of radical imams who are operationally part of al Qaeda
conceivably might be. The distinction has to be more meaningful, obviously, than the
mere assertion that it’s different when our guys do it. The United States, moreover,
presumably wants it known that its agents will not undertake targeted killings in the
United Kingdom under any circumstances, even if they might in Somalia; there will also
be a category of states where strategic ambiguity is preferred. Here a rule of international
law will necessarily not avail us; because of the formal equality of states, international
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law rules will have great trouble separating the Britains from the Somalias. Yet that is
precisely what policy as a practical, substantive matter requires.
But what, then, does separate them—besides, that is, the not irrelevant factors of power,
friendship and alliance with the United States and its community of allies? The most
obvious factor is that a failed state creates ungoverned territory in which terrorists can
find haven. While that is the most obvious case, however, the truly ungoverned territory
of a truly failed state is probably not the most dangerous with respect to the harboring of
terrorist organizations; precisely because it is obviously ungoverned, objections to
intervening there are fewer even by those who would ordinarily object. The most
dangerous safe havens, rather, are not entirely failed states, but states which are
functioning sufficiently to provide the levers of a state to terrorist organizations, either
because the state is a fully functioning one that shares, ideologically or tactically, aims
with the terrorists, or because the state is functioning sufficiently to provide both a buffer
against outside pressure and a launching pad, but not sufficiently to prevent the
disaggregation of important powers in favor of the terrorists. This latter description
captures at least part of the complex situation of al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan.
These situations mark out the most important category of places in which the United
States might see the value of targeted killing.
At the other extreme are liberal democracies functioning under the rule of law that
permits the adjudication of legal claims such as the question of Russian agent
involvement in the London incident. It is sometimes suggested that the genuinely
“neutral” way of dividing places in which some form of forcible covert activity (usually
speaking of abduction of an alleged terrorist) is acceptable from where it is not is the
presence, first, of a functioning state. The difficulty with stopping there is that Iran is a
functioning state, and for that very reason a successful sponsor of terrorist groups. Next,
then, it is suggested that it must be a functioning state combined with the rule of law, by
which extradition and other such claims can be openly and neutrally adjudicated. The
difficulty is that it is possible to have a state with a reasonably neutral rule of law that is
part of a system that is neither liberal nor democratic, and which is entirely sympathetic
to the aims and open to the means of terrorism—not frequently, but certainly possible.
At some point, in other words, however much one might point to neutral criteria such as
the rule of law, or quasi-universal criteria such as “liberal democracy,” in the end they do
not quite describe the dispositive factors. When it comes to the specific issue of terrorism,
it comes down to whether a state (or a sufficiently powerful and independent part of it) is
willing to give haven to enemies of the United States. That and the costs and risks of
using covert force, including the risk of its becoming known, versus the benefits. 100
There are indeed overwhelmingly principled reasons why the United States would not do
such in London, but those principles are not completely neutral; they have also very
much to do with the fact of the ideals and interests that the United States and the United
Kingdom share.
Comity, therefore, is a powerful—if non-legal, non-law-based—argument against violent
covert action, targeted killing, abduction, and similar acts. Indeed, it might well be the
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most powerful, or at least the most accurate, argument in assigning policy responses. But
it is a calibrated argument, not a categorical one—an argument that operates on a sliding
scale with respect to the community of nations: friends, allies, those who might cooperate
under a carrot or stick, enemies, and territory only nominally governed. We should note
as well that this is a matter that implicates not only state sovereignty—which we directly
challenge when we engage in a targeted killing without the host state’s consent—but also
human rights. All things equal, the best and proper way to proceed is through
mechanisms of the rule of law: presentation of evidence to a neutral tribunal and
transparent mechanisms of justice. We prefer this both for principled reasons and for
practical ones: intelligence methods are very far from infallible. But things are not always
equal when it comes to preventing terrorism, and in that regard not all states are equal,
either.
But it would lead the reader astray not to acknowledge that of anything in this chapter,
the proposal of a rule of comity for sovereign states in which the United States would
undertake targeted killing and sovereign states in which it would not is purely a proposal
of policy—and the least compatible with widely held assumptions of the international law
community insofar as it contravenes the basic assumption of the sovereign equality of
states. On the other hand, it has the virtue of realist clarity, how the United States
behaves, and how other states behave. But, to reiterate, this is all hypothesizing about
policy, not law.

What Should Congress Do?
Does this analysis offer any practical policy prescriptions for Congress and the
administration? The problem is not so much a need for new legislation to create new
structures or new policies. The legislative category in which many instances of targeted
killing might take place in the future already exists. The task for Congress and the
administration, rather, is instead to preserve a category that is likely to be put under
pressure in the future and, indeed, is already seen by many as a legal non-starter under
international law.
Before addressing what Congress should do in this regard, we might ask from a strictly
strategic political standpoint whether, given that the Obama Administration is committed
to this policy anyway, whether it is politically prudent to draw public attention to the
issue at all. Israeli officials might be threatened with legal action in Spain; but so far no
important actor has shown an appetite for taking on the Obama Administration. Perhaps it
is better to let sleeping political dogs lie.
These questions require difficult political calculations. However, the sources cited above
suggest that even if no one is quite prepared at this moment to take on the Obama
Administration on targeted killing, the intellectual and legal pieces of the challenge are
already set up and on the table. Having asserted certain positions concerning human
rights law and its application and the United States having unthinkingly abandoned its
self-defense rationale for its policy, the play can be made at any time—at some later time
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in the Obama Administration or in the next Republican administration, prying apart the
“American” position to create a de facto alliance among Democrats and Europeans and
thereby undermining the ability of the United States to craft a unified American security
strategy. 101 The United States would be best served if the Obama Administration did that
exceedingly rare thing in international law and diplomacy: Getting the United States out
in front of the issue by making plain the American position, rather than merely reacting in
surprise when its sovereign prerogatives are challenged by the international soft-law
community.
The deeper issue here is not merely a strategic and political one about targeted killing and
drones but goes to the very grave policy question of whether it is time to move beyond
the careful ambiguity of the CIA’s authorizing statute in referring to covert uses of force
under the doctrines of vital national interest and self-defense. Is it time to abandon
strategic ambiguity with regards to the Fifth Function and assert the right to use force in
self-defense and yet in “peacetime”—that is, outside of the specific context of an armed
conflict within the meaning of international humanitarian law? Quite possibly, the
strategic ambiguity, in a world in which secrecy is more and more difficult, and in the
general fragmentation of voice and ownership of international law, has lost its raison
d’etre. This is a larger question than the one undertaken here, but on a range of issues
including covert action, interrogation techniques, detention policy, and others, a general
approach of overt legislation that removes ambiguity is to be preferred.
The single most important role for Congress to play in addressing targeted killings,
therefore, is the open, unapologetic, plain insistence that the American understanding of
international law on this issue of self-defense is legitimate. The assertion, that is, that the
United States sees its conduct as permissible for itself and for others. And it is the putting
of congressional strength behind the official statements of the executive branch as the
opinio juris of the United States, its authoritative view of what international law is on this
subject. If this statement seems peculiar, that is because the task—as fundamental as it
is—remains unfortunately poorly understood.
Yet if it is really a matter of political consensus between Left and Right that targeted
killing is a tool of choice for the United States in confronting its non-state enemies, then
this is an essential task for Congress to play in support of the Obama Administration as it
seeks to speak with a single voice for the United States to the rest of the world. The
Congress needs to backstop the administration in asserting to the rest of the world—
including to its own judiciary—how the United States understands international law
regarding targeted killing. And it needs to make an unapologetic assertion that its views,
while not dispositive or binding on others, carry international authority to an extent that
relatively few others do—even in our emerging multi-polar world. International law
traditionally, after all, accepts that states with particular interests, power, and impact in
the world, carry more weight in particular matters than other states. The American view
of maritime law matters more than does landlocked Bolivia’s. American views on
international security law, as the core global provider of security, matter more than do
those of Argentina, Germany or, for that matter, NGOs or academic commentators. But it
has to speak—and speak loudly—if it wishes to be heard. It is an enormously important
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instance of the need for the United States to re-take “ownership” of international law—
not as its arbiter, nor as the superpower alone, but as a very powerful, very important, and
very legitimate sovereign state.
Intellectually, continuing to squeeze all forms and instances of targeted killing by
standoff platform under the law of IHL armed conflict is probably not the most
analytically compelling way to proceed. It is certainly not a practical long-term approach.
Not everyone who is an intuitively legitimate target from the standpoint of self-defense or
vital national security, after all, will be already part of an armed conflict or combatant in
the strict IHL sense. Requiring that we use such IHL concepts for a quite different
category is likely to have the deleterious effect of deforming the laws of war, over the
long term—starting, for example, with the idea of a “global war,” which is itself a certain
deformation of the IHL concept of hostilities and armed conflict.
The most intellectually honest approach would be to begin from the category of selfdefense as the U.S. has traditionally understood it in international law and then defend the
category as it currently exists in U.S. domestic statutory law for the intelligence
community—that as long as a targeted killing legitimately meets the legal criteria of selfdefense, it can be lawful to target people who might not be, under the strict law of IHL
armed conflict, combatants. Needless to say, this for the moment appears to be a political
non-starter—as evidenced by the fact that even the Bush Administration seems never to
have engaged in a targeted killing of someone it conceded was not, legally speaking, a
combatant under IHL. In practical terms, the space Congress needs to defend is targeted
killing within the broad vision of armed conflict as defined by the traditional American
interpretations of the inherent right of self defense.
Specifically, Congress and the Obama Administration should find ways, formal and
informal, of asserting that as long as targeted killings satisfy standards of self-defense,
the United States regards them as lawful in the sense of not per se illegal; and that these
operations can and will be carried out as part of essential counterterrorism under existing
domestic legal authority granted to the intelligence community and the CIA. One way to
do this is by adding language to the basic CIA statute specifically providing what is
already implicit: that the power to carry out its “other” functions apply in peacetime and
is not limited to circumstances of internationally recognized IHL armed conflict. 102 In so
doing, Congress should refer in the statute to the exercise of vital national security
interests as including the inherent right of self-defense as the United States interprets that
legal concept. There is value in tying such instances of uses of force under domestic law
directly to the assertion of a right of self-defense under international law in order to make
clear its basis and that it is different from IHL armed conflict.
The independent legal existence of the category of intelligence agency uses of force as
lawful self-defense, including targeted killing, should also be stated—frequently—in
hearings, in official statements of the administration, by the CIA, the Justice Department,
and the State Department as the opinio juris of the United States. This policy can be
expressed by Congress in statements accompanying appropriations bills and other
legislative pronouncements. Given the extent to which such issues increasingly appear in
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U.S. domestic litigation, such as cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute, the
Department of Justice needs a standing policy vigorously to defend this position as the
foreign policy of the United States, assented to by the political branches, to which the
judiciary should pay due deference.
Most importantly, Congress should reiterate and endorse two things regarding the
ICCPR. The first is the long-standing U.S. position that the ICCPR does not apply
extraterritorially. The second is that IHL substitutes for, and displaces, any more general
human rights regimes, including the ICCPR, in armed conflict within the meaning of
IHL. This is important because so much of the international law community now takes it
as a matter of course both that the ICCPR does apply extraterritorially and that it
continues to apply in the course of an IHL armed conflict. As a consequence, as we have
seen, virtually any targeted killing can be easily characterized as an extrajudicial
execution—and the agents who carry it out, whether civilian or military, might at some
point be threatened with indictment in some jurisdiction or international tribunal for an
international crime. If Congress does not want that to happen, it needs to push back
against the premise that the ICCPR has anything to say about American conduct of such
operations.
Even as it defends targeted killings against those who would simply treat the category as
having disappeared all but entirely under international law, Congress and the
administration need to offer standards to regulate the practice of targeted killing. This is
hard. With respect to domestic law, proposals to create a comprehensive charter for the
CIA have come and gone without fruition with regularity over the decades. 103 The reason
they do not succeed is that discretion is at the heart of the intelligence agency action
agenda. Likewise, strategic deniability and the tacit collective action game among the
great powers to acquiesce in this category so long as it is not celebrated as such and
remains within a set of loose and unstated bounds both conspire to keep the rules unstated
or, at least, stated vaguely. The same is true with respect to the specific question of
targeted killing; there is no comprehensive charter that can be written and yet be
effective.
There are, however, areas in which regulatory structure can be given—and should be, in
order that the law not be merely a blank check. We start from necessity and
proportionality in the conduct of self-defense operations. None of this will satisfy those
for whom the category is morally wrong and legally impermissible as such—but for those
for whom approval is possible in principle and yet look for the devil in the details,
important aspects of regulatory control would include the two basic issues in targeted
killing: the identification of a target (is this who we say it is?) and the minimizing of
collateral damage to innocent third parties. Congress should therefore instruct the
administration and the CIA to brief the intelligence committees as to the mechanisms
used to make targeting selection decisions—not just in the case of Predator campaigns
undertaken as part of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan extending over to Pakistan, but
also its protocols for determining targets outside of the existing conflict zones and armed
conflict at all, which is to say, any targeted killing. In the same vein, Congress can
instruct the CIA in hearings, in briefings to the intelligence committees, and in other
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forums that it expects to be informed as to protocols the CIA would apply in targeted
killing situations outside of armed conflict zones to ensure minimal collateral damage,
respect for proportionality, and discrimination in targeting—and to ensure that the CIA is
committed to application of the substance of the standard law of war targeting
considerations regarding protection of innocents. At a minimum, those collateral damage
protocols should adopt those used in IHL—although in many instances, the appropriate
level of caution to protect innocent civilians might well be higher than that required on
the conventional battlefield. Standards drawn from IHL should be a policy minimum, not
a maximum.
Congress should also consider instructing the CIA to develop criteria, secret or otherwise,
for determining—perhaps subject to revision by Congress—what countries among U.S.
friends and allies would not be places where the United States would consider
undertaking targeted killing under any circumstances. Of anything said in this chapter,
perhaps the most jarring to the international lawyer is the claim that the U.S. might need
to distinguish as a matter of informal policy among states in which it would never
contemplate a targeted killing and the states in which circumstances might make it
necessary, with or without consent. Of course, such a distinction lies at the back of every
political calculation of targeted killing, the same as calculations of friends and foes and
those in-between. Yet this proposition cannot really be expressed as a matter of
international law as such, because international law begins from the sovereign equality of
states. This proposal takes a distinctly realist tack and breaks them down into friends,
enemies, places where the rule of law obtains, places where it does not, and other such
distinguishing criteria.
Congress could engage in this thoroughly political exercise by, for example, asking for
hearings in which the administration would be invited to offer the criteria under which
state sovereignty might be ignored and a targeted killing undertaken. Congress could
instruct the administration to provide private assurances, and make the discussion of who
and why a matter of intelligence oversight briefings. It is an idea that has costs and
benefits, to be sure, and is only recommended, if by anything, on the virtue of realism.
Finally, Congress should greatly beef up the level of briefings and information provided
to the intelligence committees and should review the issue of oversight of covert and
clandestine operations and determine whether those mechanisms of oversight are
sufficiently robust and contemporaneous. At least upon consideration of the controversies
now emerging over briefings to Congressional oversight committees regarding
interrogation, they are almost certainly not sufficient. The point about briefings to
Congress is partly to allow it to exercise its democratic role as the people’s
representatives; just as important, however, is that such mechanisms ensure, if properly
and thoroughly carried out and documented, that the Congress has either acquiesced in an
executive decision or taken steps positively to object. Any administration should want to
ensure that it has plainly and fully informed the intelligence committees so that the
accountability and burden of making very difficult decisions about targeted killing are
shared across the political branches of government. So there’s a mutual advantage here.
Moreover, there is room to consider forms of public reporting after the fact in some
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fashion to ensure that the public can know what actions have been taken. A regime of
violent covert action based around pure secrecy and executive discretion is a recipe for
indictments. The political branches should be forced into joint accountability. If targeted
killings are really to become a tool of choice for certain types of counterterrorism, our
oversight mechanisms need to reflect their new importance.

Conclusion
The ultimate lesson for Congress and the Obama Administration about targeted killings is
“Use it or lose it.” This is as true of its legal rationale as it is of the tool itself. Targeted
killings conducted from standoff platforms, with improving technologies in surveillance
and targeting, are a vital strategic, but also humanitarian, tool in long-term
counterterrorism. War will always be important as an option; so will the tools of law
enforcement, as well as all the other non-force aspects of intelligence work: diplomacy
and coordination with friends and allies. But the long-standing legal authority to use force
covertly, as part of the writ of the intelligence community, remains a crucial tool—one
the new administration will need and evidently knows it will need. So will
administrations beyond it.
Although the U.S. is in a war, in its view, with al Qaeda, much of the world does not
accept this premise and the threat from transnational terrorism will not, in any event,
forever be with al Qaeda. Even within the world of jihadist transnational violence, al
Qaeda is gradually becoming a notional enemy. This is a popular notion with some as a
meme by which to announce that the threat is past or overrated; that is not my intent here
at all. Rather, I am concerned to ensure that we do not tie our hands needlessly tomorrow
by assuming that the nature of the threat and the specific legal rationale offered to address
it will always be the same. Transnational jihadist networks are indeed becoming more
diffuse, less and less directly tied in a “corporate” sense to al Qaeda. They are inspired by
it, perhaps, and driven by a shared ideology, but not under its command, control, active
direction, or other indicia of affiliation in an ordinary sense. 104 Terrorism by ideological
affinity and loose network is likely to become more, rather than less, the norm into the
future. The death of Osama bin Laden and his top aides by Predator strike tomorrow
would alter national security counterterrorism calculations rather less than we might all
hope. As new terrorist enemies emerge, so long as they are “jihadist” in character, we
might continue referring to them as “affiliated” with al Qaeda and therefore cobelligerent. But the label will eventually become a mere legalism in order to bring them
under the umbrella of an AUMF passed after September 11. Looking even further into
the future, terrorism will not always be about something plausibly tied to September 11
or al Qaeda at all. Circumstances alone, in other words, will put enormous pressure on—
and ultimately render obsolete—the legal framework we currently employ to justify these
operations.
What we can do is to insist on defining armed conflict self-defense broadly enough, and
human rights law narrowly enough—as the United States has traditionally done—to
avoid exacerbating the problem and making it acute sooner, or even immediately.
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Ideology and ideas matter in shaping policy, especially at the intersection of international
realpolitik, diplomacy, and law. Thus, I have made frequent reference to a loose
community of interpretation, formation, deployment, and, really, “ownership” of
international law. Such “ownership” matters too. We stand at a curious moment in which
the strategic trend is toward reliance upon targeted killing; and within broad U.S.
political circles even across party lines, a political trend toward legitimization; and yet
the international legal trend is also severely and sharply to contain it within a narrow
conception of either the law of armed conflict under IHL or human rights and law
enforcement, rather than its traditional conception as self-defense in international law and
regulation as covert action under domestic intelligence law. Many in the world of ideas
and policy have already concluded that targeted killing as a category, even if proffered as
self-defense, is unacceptable and indeed all but per se illegal. If the United States wishes
to preserve its traditional powers and practices in this area, it had better assert them. Else
it will find that as a practical matter they have dissipated through desuetude.
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